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THE RULE 10b-5 SUIT: LOSS CAUSATION
PLEADING STANDARDS IN PRIVATE
SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS AFTER DURA
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. BROUDO
Evan Hill*
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo. The Court held that a plaintiff alleging securities fraud must prove
that a defendant's misrepresentation caused actual economic loss. The
Dura decision put to rest the loss causation standard applied by several
U.S. courts of appeals, which allowed plaintiffs to merely plead that a
misrepresentation caused an artificially inflated purchase price. However,
in Dura's wake, the circuit courts have fashioned divergent standards with
respect to pleading loss causation. The courts currently apply pleading
standards ranging from the lenient and generally applicable Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a) to the stringent and fraud-specific Rule 9(b). This
Note analyzes the various loss causation pleading standards applied by the
circuit courts and urges the Supreme Court to adopt the standard developed
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit's
loss causation pleading standard should be adopted because its two-part
test ensures that only claims alleging a close connection between loss and
misrepresentation survive pleadings, yet refrains from adopting a
heightened standard unsupported by Congress or Supreme Court
precedent.
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INTRODUCTION
It's the little suit that made Bill Lerach . . . famous, scads of plaintiffs
lawyers rich, and more than one corporate general counsel wonder why he
ever went to law school in the first place. It's the securities class-action
lawsuit, specifically, the ' 10b-5' suit .... I
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule lOb-5 2 suit is the
foremost investor protection tool available to those who have been cheated
in the securities marketplace. 3 Rule lOb-5 is typically invoked by class
action plaintiffs against a defendant with whom the plaintiffs have invested
significant funds.4 A basic factual scenario giving rise to a Rule lOb-5
claim may appear as follows: Corporation X reports that it sells 100
widgets every month. Corporation X's stock price is high. Investors,
encouraged by reported widget sales, buy millions of dollars worth of
Corporation X stock. It is then revealed that Corporation X misrepresented
true widget sales, which had in actuality been only ten widgets per month.
Corporation X's stock price plummets and investors lose millions. The
investors now have a Rule 1 Ob-5 claim against Corporation X for securities
fraud. To prevail, the plaintiff investors must prove that Corporation X's
misrepresentation caused their economic loss. 5 Here, the cause of the
plaintiffs' loss is obvious: when Corporation X's misrepresentation became
public, the market responded by correcting what was before an inflated
stock price. However, as the facts become more complicated, the answer to
the loss causation question becomes less clear. Suppose all industry
participants competing with Corporation X saw an identical stock price
drop. Was the plaintiffs' loss caused by the misrepresentation or industry-
wide market effects? Alternatively, suppose Corporation X sells many
widgets and had misrepresented sales for some widgets, but not those on
which the plaintiffs relied when purchasing Corporation X stock. Can the
plaintiffs claim Corporation X misrepresented its goodwill, rather than
widget sales, and caused loss when it was revealed that Corporation X was
in fact run by scoundrels? Or perhaps plaintiffs instead sue the investment
analyst who recommended Corporation X stock as a red-hot buy. It later
turns out that the analyst misrepresented the stock risk because his banking
firm was also Corporation X's underwriter. Has the analyst caused the
plaintiffs' loss?
1. Posting of Ashby Jones to Wall Street Journal Law Blog, http:/iblogs.wsj.com/law/
2010/01/05/is-the-golden-era-of-securities-class-action-suits-coming-to-an-end/ (Jan. 5,
2010, 10:41 EST).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
3. See infra Part I.B (discussing the history of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and Rule 1Ob-5 in particular).
4. See infra Part II (analyzing securities fraud cases where the plaintiffs are
predominately investors suing the entities with which they have invested funds).
5. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005) ("A private plaintiff
who claims securities fraud must prove that the defendant's fraud caused an economic loss."
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006))).
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Whether suits bearing these difficult loss causation questions ever have
an opportunity to go to trial (or more likely, to settle) depends on the
pleading standard. 6 The U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo7 held that a plaintiff must establish loss
causation by proving an actual economic loss. 8  The Court did not,
however, establish a loss causation pleading standard.9 In Dura's wake, the
U.S. courts of appeals have fashioned divergent pleading standards based
on their individual readings of Dura.10 This Note discusses the range of
pleading standards currently applied by the circuit courts to the loss
causation element of the Rule 1Ob-5 suit.
The foundations of the loss causation pleading problem lie in the
Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) I and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
('34 Act). 12 The '33 Act delineates the process of securities distribution,
while the '34 Act relates to securities exchanges on the open market.13 The
Acts were passed in response to the financial turmoil that enveloped the
nation during the Great Depression. 14 While the Acts provided express
private causes of action for plaintiffs, judicially developed implied actions
have done the most to enforce their proyisions. 15
The most frequently litigated securities actions fall under section 10(b) of
the '34 Act 16 and Rule lOb-5.17  Litigation under these provisions is
particularly prevalent because they are "the so called 'catchall' fraud
provision[s]" that broadly "prohibit the making of false and misleading
statements or omissions in connection with the purchase and sale of
securities." 18  Violations of these provisions include fraud based on
corporate finances, 19 the riskiness of investments, 20 and the market viability
of new products.21
6. See, e.g., Ann Morales Olazabal, The Search for "Middle Ground": Towards a
Harmonized Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's New Pleading
Standard, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 153, 155-56 (2001).
7. 544 U.S. 336.
8. Id. at 346-47.
9. See infra Part I.E.3 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's deficient treatment of loss
causation).
10. See infra Part II (identifying the various loss causation pleading standards developed
by the U.S. courts of appeals in light of unclear guidance from the Supreme Court).
11. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006).
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (2006). For more
information on the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
('34 Act), see generally Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 37-39 (4th ed. 2001).
13. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 38.
14. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385,408 (1990).
15. See infra Part I.C (discussing the development of implied civil liabilities under the
'34 Act).
16. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b),.15 U.S.C. § 78j.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
18. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
19. See ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. The Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 95-96 (2d Cir.
2007).
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One of the crucial developments in securities law of recent vintage is the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).12 Among other
things, the PSLRA clarified that heightened pleading standards must apply
for only two specific elements of a private securities fraud claim: material
misrepresentation and scienter. 23 This Note focuses on loss causation, an
essential element to securities fraud claims that Congress explicitly codified
in the PSLRA.24 Unlike material misrepresentation and scienter, however,
Congress failed to specify a pleading standard for loss causation.25
Having been excluded from the explicit mandates of the PSLRA, the
pleading standard applied to loss causation differed among the circuit
courts. 26 The Supreme Court finally considered the loss causation pleading
standard problem in Dura.27 Framing loss causation in light of fraud
common law, the original purpose of the '33 and '34 Acts, the mandates of
the PSLRA, and various circuit court decisions, the Dura opinion did little
to establish anything close to a concrete loss causation pleading standard. 28
The shortcomings of Dura are exemplified by the various loss causation
pleading standards currently applied by the circuit courts. 29  These
standards range from the easily met and generally applicable Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 8(a)30 to the narrow, fraud specific, FRCP
9(b). 3 1
Part I of this Note discusses the background of the '33 and '34 Acts and
outlines the overall purpose and goals of securities law. This part also
20. See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2005).
21. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 339 (2005).
22. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) was passed in
response to inconsistent application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 9(b) at the
circuit court level to securities fraud cases. See Teachers' Ret. Sys. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162,
171 (4th Cir. 2007). The disparate circuit court treatment was largely due to a lack of
direction from Congress in terms of applying section 10(b) in private actions. See S. REP.
No. 104-98, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 683 ("The lack of congressional
involvement has left judges free to develop conflicting legal standards, thereby creating
substantial uncertainties and opportunities for abuses of investors, issuers, professional firms
and others.").
23. Hunter, 477 F.3d at 172; see infra Part I.D.2. To satisfy the element of scienter, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with the requisite intent or state of mind.
Hunter, 477 F.3d at 172.
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006).
25. See id.; Hunter, 477 F.3d at 185.
26. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 340.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265 n.23
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that the Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo did not set
forth a pleading standard, but merely rejected the standard applied by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
29. See infra Part II (identifying a range of loss causation pleading standards, from
flexible to stringent, currently applied by the circuit courts).
30. FRCP 8(a) merely requires a plaintiff to submit a "short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2).
31. FRCP 9(b) requires that a plaintiff "state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
2010] 2663
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
considers the overactive securities plaintiffs' bar that arose because of the
broad language and absence of private claim provisions in the Acts.
Following this discussion is an analysis of Congress's response to the rise
in frivolous securities suits through its enactment of the PSLRA. The
particular problem of loss causation pleading remaining in light of the
PSLRA and Dura is also framed.
Part II explores the circuit split that has arisen since Dura with respect to
loss causation pleading. The various loss causation standards applied by
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits are identified. 32 The problems that this split poses with
respect to the concerns addressed by Congress's enactment of the PSLRA
are also discussed.
Part III compares and analyzes the loss causation standards applied by
the various circuits. This inquiry identifies the stringency of each standard.
As part of this analysis, each circuit's interpretation of Dura and loss
causation is evaluated in terms of its relation to the overall goals of
securities fraud litigation and, in particular, the concerns addressed by the
PSLRA. Finally, this Note argues that the Supreme Court should adopt the
two-part loss causation standard applied by the Second Circuit. The Second
Circuit requires plaintiffs to plead that the loss suffered was foreseeable and
within a zone of risk concealed by the misrepresentation. This standard is
preferable for three reasons. First, and most importantly, the test is most
clearly in line with the Supreme Court's decision in Dura and congressional
intent in passing the PSLRA to minimize frivolous securities lawsuits. 33
Second, Congress used the pleading standards of the Second Circuit as a
guide when passing the PSLRA. 34  Third, the test's foreseeability
requirement ensures that if a risk is otherwise concealed and causes harm, a
defendant will only be held liable for losses foreseeably caused by its
actions. 35
I. THE SECURITIES LAWS, Loss CAUSATION, AND DURA
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. V. BROUDO
The role played by the loss causation element in private securities fraud
claims can be best understood when put in context of the purpose and
history of securities law as a whole. Part I provides background
information on U.S. securities law, beginning with the cornerstones: the
'33 and '34 Acts. Section 10(b) of the '34 Act outlaws deceptive practices
in securities trading and is the primary statutory basis for the suits
considered in this Note. 36 Next, Rule lOb-5, adopted pursuant to the '34
32. The remaining circuits have not directly ruled on the loss causation pleading
standard question.
33. See infra Part III.A (advocating that the Supreme Court adopt the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit's loss causation pleading standard).
34. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
35. See infra Part III.A.
36. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
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Act as a measure to enhance enforcement of section 10(b), is introduced.
The evolution of the private cause of action available to investors under
section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 is also discussed. This is followed by a brief
examination of the most recent congressional mandate affecting private
securities fraud claims: the PSLRA. Finally, the Supreme Court decision
in Dura is analyzed in detail in order to isolate the loss causation problem
that this Note subsequently addresses.
A. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The events leading up to and rationale behind the codification of the first
U.S. securities statutes are the starting point of today's securities laws. The
decade preceding the Great Depression saw unprecedented growth in
securities underwriting, valuation, and trading. 37 The precipitous rise of
valuable securities was largely due to the "industrial prosperity of the
1920's."38 As securities prices rose, successful businesses quickly began to
issue greater numbers of securities. 39 Accumulated funds from securities
issuance found their way back into the market through brokers' loans,
which facilitated further transactions. 40 This snowball effect resulted in
continually increasing capital in securities markets, which markedly
increased investor participation.41 As trading in securities became ever
more profitable, investors engaged in increasingly risky transactions, while
issuers exercised little due diligence in security valuation and risk
disclosure. 42  Amateur investors engaged in extensive securities
speculation, investing borrowed money in securities they knew little
about.43 Once the excessive speculative trading reached its breaking point
and the Great Depression gripped the national economy, Congress, as well
as the overwhelming majority of industry participants, called for legislative
intervention. 44
One of the major issues under scrutiny for legislative reform was the
actual practice of issuing securities.45 Issuers such as investment trusts and
utilities had been suspected of engaging in careless and abusive
underwriting, where excessive securities were purposely issued, minimal
37. See EDWARD T. MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES ACT AND THE S.E.C.
18 (1948). Securities underwriting is the process by which new securities are purchased
from the issuer by an underwriter and then sold on the open market. See, e.g., Joseph K.
Leahy, What Due Diligence Dilemma? Re-envisioning Underwriters' Continuous Due
Diligence After WorldCom, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 2001, 2010 (2009).




42. See id. at 18-19.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 20; James D. Gordon III, Acorns and Oaks: Implied Rights of Action
Under the Securities Acts, 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 62, 64 (2004) ("When Congress enacted
the securities acts, it was painfully aware of the Great Depression and believed that it was
largely precipitated by abuses in the securities markets.").
45. See MCCORMICK, supra note 37, at 21.
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information was disclosed to the public, and the information disclosed was
either false or unsupported by actual findings.46 The investing public
suffered severe economic loss through its heavy dealing with what were in
fact securities of very high risk.47  President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
message to Congress, delivered soon after his first election, reflected the
scope of the reform required: "This proposal adds to the ancient rule of
caveat emptor, the further doctrine, 'let the seller also beware.' It puts the
burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give impetus to
honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence." 48
To that end, Congress passed the '33 Act with the overriding purpose of
protecting investors.49 The Act was intended to decrease opportunism and
fraud by mandating extensive seller disclosure prior to stock issuance and
providing for both civil and criminal liability for its violation. 50 In order to
protect investors after the issuance of a security, Congress passed the '34
Act. 51 The '34 Act protects investors by requiring securities issuers to
conduct periodic disclosures after their securities have entered the market.5 2
B. Section lO(b) of the '34 Act and SEC Rule 1Ob-5
Section 10(b) of the '34 Act is the foremost antifraud provision in U.S.
securities law and is utilized through its primary mechanism of
enforcement, SEC Rule lOb-5. Section 10(b) broadly prohibits deceptive
and fraudulent security practices that are in violation of an SEC Rule. 53
Thus, section 10(b) provides the foundation for implied private securities
fraud claims. 54  Section 10(b), titled "Manipulative and deceptive
devices," 55 states the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may
46. See id. at 19.
47. See id. at 20.
48. 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) (statement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
49. See MCCORMICK, supra note 37, at 24-25; Nicholas Fortune Schanbaum,
Scheme Liability: Rule lOb-5(a) and Secondary Actor Liability After Central Bank, 26 REv.
LITIG. 183, 186 (2007).
50. See MCCORMICK, supra note 37, at 24-25.
51. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 38; Schanbaum, supra note 49, at 186.
52. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 38. In addition to periodic disclosures, the
'34 Act also requires disclosures in other contexts where investor knowledge is essential,
such as corporate proxy contests and tender offers. See id.
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
54. See, e.g., Schanbaum, supra note 49, at 187-88.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
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prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors .56
Section 10(b) explicitly vests the SEC with the power to create rules to
enforce section 10(b)'s prohibitions. 57 The SEC exercised this power in
1942 through its adoption of Rule lOb-5. 5 8 Rule lOb-5 is one of the most
important and widely used rules promulgated by the SEC. 59 Rule lOb-5,
titled "Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices," 60 states the
following:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
6 1
Rule 1Ob-5 broadly prohibits the deceptive activity mentioned in section
10(b), in fact to such an extent that Rule 10b-5 has been referred to as a
"long-arm provision in which the SEC forbids everything the statute gives it
power to forbid."'62 Plaintiffs thus employ Rule lOb-5 in tandem with
section 10(b) when alleging securities fraud. 63
C. Private Causes ofAction for Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
This section considers the use of section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 by private
plaintiffs and introduces the judicially developed rubric for evaluating these
claims. The '34 Act is used to protect investors through its express
56. Id.
57. Id.; see Schanbaum, supra note 49, at 187; see also Gordon, supra note 44, at 65
("Under the authority of Section 10(b), the Securities and Exchange Commission
promulgated Rule lOb-5."). The SEC is also empowered to enforce other sections of the '34
Act, as well as the prohibitions of the '33 Act. See, e.g., Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at
37 ("The SEC currently administers . . . the Securities Act of 1933 [and] the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 .... "); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 37, at 28 ("[The SEC] is
empowered to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of the ['33 Act].").
58. See Schanbaum, supra note 49, at 187.
59. See Thel, supra note 14, at 463. Although now a prominent and well-defined
weapon in the SEC's armory, Rule lob-5 was drafted and passed in a single day as a hasty
response to a particular corporate misrepresentation. See, e.g., Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note
12, at 840; Schanbaum, supra note 49, at 187.
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2009).
61. Id.
62. Thel, supra note 14, at 463.
63. See, e.g., Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
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provisions as well as through implied grounds for civil liability. 64 Implied
civil liabilities have historically provided the strongest means of investor
protection under the '34 Act.65  Although some commentators have
expressed doubt as to whether Congress intended various implied liabilities
to exist under the Acts, 66 courts have long held that the validity of implied
liabilities for violating section 10(b) of the '34 Act and Rule 10b-5 is
beyond doubt.67
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, while explicitly prohibiting deceptive
securities practices, provide little guidance as to how courts should evaluate
claims alleging their violation.68 For this reason, the elements required to
prove section 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 violations are almost entirely judicially
constructed.69 Implied civil liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
has developed to closely resemble a common-law tort claim: "[t]he courts
have implied from these statutes and Rule a private damages action, which
resembles, but is not identical to, common-law tort actions for deceit and
misrepresentation. ' '70 The Supreme Court has specified the following
elements of a securities fraud claim under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5:
(1) a material misrepresentation or omission, (2) scienter, (3) a connection
with the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance (transaction causation),
(5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation.71
64. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 1105. Express civil liabilities available to
plaintiffs for assertion against '34 Act violators can be found in sections 9(e), 16(b), 18, and
29(b) of the '34 Act. See id. at 1162. Before the passage of the Acts, "there was no way for
the federal government to deal with securities fraud except by criminal prosecution for
violating the mail fraud statute." Id. at 837 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006)).
65. See id. at 1169-70.
66. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 44, at 62-63 (arguing that because Congress explicitly
created private rights of action in some sections of the Acts, private rights are not intended to
attach to other sections).
67. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 n.10 (1983) (tracing the
history and expansion of implied private rights under section 10(b) and Rule I Ob-5); Kardon
v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) ("In other words, in view of the
general purpose of the Act, the mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not
sufficient to negative what the general law implies."); Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at
1174 ("'It is now established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b)."' (quoting
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971))); see also
Laura D. Mruk, The Proverbial Axe to the Judicial Oak: The Impact of Stoneridge on
Plaintiff's Actions Under § 10(b), 29 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 281, 284-85 (2009) ("Despite in-
fighting among legal scholars regarding the history and scope of rule lOb-5, it has come to
be accepted as enforceable publicly through an implied right of action.").
68. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1 Ob-5 (2009); see also Schanbaum, supra note 49, at 187 ("But no details were
provided with respect to the elements of a Rule lob-5 violation or the level of conduct that
would constitute a violation.").
69. See Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market-
Based Securities Suits Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 33 (2008); Gordon,
supra note 44, at 65; Schanbaum, supra note 49, at 187-88 ("Thus, the Supreme Court was
left to determine the ultimate extent of section 10(b) by examining the statute in the context
of the Securities Acts as a whole.").
70. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
71. Id. at 341-42; see Ann Morales Olazdbal, Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market
Cases Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 337, 343 (2006).
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D. Loss Causation: From Judicial Development to Codification in the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
This section briefly discusses the history of loss causation and its role as
an element of private securities fraud claims. The history of loss causation
is traced from its ad hoc development by the courts to its codification by
Congress in 1995. Additionally, loss causation is distinguished from the
related element of reliance, or transaction causation.
1. Judicially Developed Loss Causation and Its Relation to Transaction
Causation and Reliance
As discussed previously, section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 did little to
specify how one must plead a violation.72 The causation element of a
securities fraud claim is no exception and has developed through less than
consistent application over many decades. 73 The causation element of
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims originally required a showing of
causation in fact, or but-for causation, which could be satisfied by pleading
reliance. 74 This standard of proving causation undoubtedly reflected the
guidance courts sought from well-defined common-law fraud and deceit
actions. 75 While courts' interpretations of loss causation were initially
based on standards for tort claims, section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 loss
causation is conceptually distinct from these standards.76
The Second Circuit in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.77 first framed
causation in securities fraud cases as it stands today, in terms of both
transactional causation and loss causation. 78 In its decision, the court
articulated its bifurcation of the causation element: "loss causation
[requires] that the misrepresentations or omissions caused the economic
harm-and transaction causation [requires] that the violations in question
caused the appellant to engage in the transaction in question.' '79 Thus, the
court held, the plaintiffs decision to enter into a securities transaction, as
72. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
73. See Olazbal, supra note 71, at 345; Devin F. Ryan, Comment, Yet Another Bough
on the "Judicial Oak": The Second Circuit Clarifies Inquiry Notice and Its Loss Causation
Requirement Under the PSLRA in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 79 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
485, 508 (2005) ("The indispensable element of causation under the federal securities laws
was judge-made and was principally bottomed in tort law theory.").
74. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1291 (2d Cir. 1969)
(requiring the loss to be "reasonably foreseeable"); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,
462-63 (2d Cir. 1965) (finding causation per se satisfied as an extension of reliance); Loss
& SELIGMAN, supra note 12 at 1201 ("'Reliance provides the requisite causal connection
between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs injury."' (quoting Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988))); Olazdbal, supra note 71, at 343.
75. See Fry, supra note 69, at 33-34; Olazdbal, supra note 71, at 339.
76. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005); Fry, supra note 69, at
33-34.
77. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974).




well as the plaintiffs loss in connection with that transaction, must be
caused by the defendant's misrepresentation. 80
Transaction causation mirrors the causation element as applied pre-
Schlick, as a but-for causal element requiring a securities fraud plaintiff to
show that if it were not for the defendant's misrepresentation, he would not
have entered into the securities transaction. 81 - The Supreme Court in
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States82 simplified transaction causation by
holding that as long as the information the plaintiff relied on in entering the
transaction was material, transaction causation was satisfied. without
more.
83
Loss causation, on the other hand, more resembles tort proximate
cause. 84 The conceptual difference between securities loss causation and
tort proximate causation lies in why an event causes loss. 85 In a securities
case, the event that proximately (in the tort context) causes economic loss is
a disclosure of a misrepresentation, which may take the form of a press
release or government action, among other things. 86  However, that
disclosing event itself is not the reason the loss occurred. It is instead the
underlying truth revealed by the disclosure, namely the true riskiness of a
security.87
80. Id.
81. See Fry, supra note 69, at 34-37; Mruk, supra note 67, at 301. The transaction
causation requirement was particularly difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy because plaintiffs
were required ex post to show they would have acted in a particular way (not have entered a
deal) had they been privy to information that they were not aware of at the time. See Jill E.
Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REv. 811,
817 (2009).
82. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
83. Id. at 153-54 ("All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense
that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of this
decision."); see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 1202; Ryan, supra note 73, at 509
("Transaction causation, or 'but for' causation in fact, can be equated to the common law
fraud concept of reliance .... (citing Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d
Cir. 2005))).
84. See Fry, supra note 69, at 33; Ryan, supra note 73, at 509 ("[L]oss causation, the far
more subtle stepchild of causation, is arguably analogous to the tort concept of proximate or
legal causation.").
85. See Fry, supra note 69, at 34-35.
86. See, e.g., In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 117-18 (4th Cir. 2009). The
proximate cause of the plaintiffs' loss in In re Mutual Funds Investment Litigation was a
complaint filed by the New York Attorney General against the defendants. Id. However, the
plaintiffs did not allege that it was this complaint that caused the defendant's stock price to
plummet. Instead, it was the underlying misrepresentation revealed by the complaint that
allegedly caused the plaintiffs' loss. Id.
87. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 173 ("A foreseeable injury at common law is one
proximately caused by the defendant's fault, but it cannot ordinarily be said that a drop in the
value of a security is 'caused' by the misstatements or omissions made about it, as opposed
to the underlying circumstance that is concealed or misstated.").
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2. Loss Causation Codified: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995
The PSLRA codified the judicially determined elements of a section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 securities fraud claim, including loss causation. This
section discusses the overall intent of the PSLRA, thus giving context to
later courts' applications of loss causation, as well as Congress's cursory
treatment of the loss causation element.
The PSLRA was the congressional response to costly abuses occurring in
the realm of private securities litigation. 88 Litigation abuses largely arose
because of uncertainty surrounding private securities fraud litigation
doctrine. 89  Specifically, plaintiffs' lawyers had used securities fraud
litigation opportunistically to reap large settlements for nonmeritorious
claims, even when the plaintiffs themselves had little to gain.90 Suits were
filed with no intention of actually litigating, but only based on settlement
value. 91 The bar for filing a complaint against a corporation was very low,
requiring "little or no due diligence." 92 Complaints were frequently filed
and quickly followed with expensive discovery requests, after publicly
traded companies' stock prices dropped or adverse earnings statements
were released. 93 Thus, volatile start-ups experiencing a downturn in stock
price would often receive a slew of complaints alleging that the company
misrepresented its true value. 94 These concerns were succinctly expressed
by the House Committee on Commerce when considering securities
litigation reform legislation:
Today, our litigation system allows, indeed encourages, abusive "strike
suits"--class actions typically brought under the antifraud provisions of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lob-5
88. See David S. Escoffery, Note, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule
10b-5 in Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 68
FORDHAM L. REv. 1781, 1809 (2000).
89. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683. Much of
this uncertainty had arisen because of a complete lack of congressional input regarding
private securities fraud actions. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. Section
10(b) causes of action were wholly judicially based and varied significantly from court to
court. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
90. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 685. Studies showed
that investors often recovered approximately ten percent of their losses through settlements,
purportedly because of self-interested plaintiffs' attorneys dominating the litigation. Id.
91. Id.; see Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead
Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869,
871 (2005); Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. IN. L. REv. 95,
97 (2004).
92. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 8, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 687.
93. See id.; Brian S. Sommer, Note, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence: Improving
Balance in the Private Securities Litigation Arena with a Screening Panel Approach, 44
WASHBURN L.J. 413, 421-22 (2005).
94. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 8, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 687; see Joseph A.
Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REv. 961, 972-73 (1994) (noting that defendants in
high-tech industries are among the hardest hit by strike suits).
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promulgated thereunder. Strike lawsuits are lawsuits filed by class action
attorneys on behalf of shareholders whose once attractive stock purchases
have failed to live up to their expectations. Volatile stock prices, rapid
product development, and technological changes make growing
companies a target. As a result, high technology, biotechnology, and
other growth companies are hardest hit.9 5
In order to combat these abuses, Congress passed the PSLRA with three
primary goals: "(1) to encourage the voluntary disclosure of information by
corporate issuers; (2) to empower investors so that they-not their
lawyers-exercise primary control over private securities litigation; and (3)
to encourage plaintiffs' lawyers to pursue valid claims and defendants to
fight abusive claims."' 96 The PSLRA increases plaintiffs' control over their
suits by creating a presumption that the investor-plaintiff with the greatest
financial investment in the defendant corporation will be the lead plaintiff.97
The PSLRA also mandates greater disclosure involving settlement details,
so investor-plaintiffs will have an opportunity to reject a settlement if it is
only favorable to their lawyers. 98
Of particular importance to this Note, the PSLRA took measures to
establish and heighten pleading standards for alleging securities fraud. 99
Specifically, Congress adopted the FRCP 9(b) pleading standard as applied
by the Second Circuit, which was considered the "most stringent" with
regard to securities fraud claims. 100 In doing so, Congress clearly set forth
Rule 9(b) as the applicable standard for the securities fraud element of
scienter. 10 1 The Second Circuit standard requires the plaintiff to "plead
facts that give rise to a 'strong inference' of defendant's fraudulent
intent."102
Congress also mandated that a heightened FRCP 9(b) standard be applied
to the element of misrepresentation: 10 3  "[t]he plaintiff must also
specifically identify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the
95. H.R. REP. No. 104-50(I), at 15 (1995).
96. S. REt,. No. 104-98, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 683.
97. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 685; see James D. Cox et al., Does the
Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1588 (2006); Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray,
Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S.
CAL. L. REv. 69, 104-06 (2008).
98. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 685.
99. Id. at 15, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 694; see Seligman, supra note 91, at
105; Ryan, supra note 73, at 500-01 ("[The PSLRA] advanced Congress's assault on strike
suits by placing ... Herculean requirements on plaintiffs pleading a cause of action under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 .... "); Sommer, supra note 93, at 423.
100. S. RE'. No. 104-98, at 15, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 694; see Seligman,
supra note 91, at 105-06.
101. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 694.
102. Id. (quoting In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993)).
However, Congress did not go so far as to codify the body of case law of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit; rather, Congress made it clear that courts may only find "this
body of law instructive." Id.
103. Id.
2672 [Vol. 78
LOSS CA USA TION AFTER DURA
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if the allegation is
made on information and belief, the plaintiff must set forth all information
in plaintiffs possession on which the belief is formed."1 04
While Congress specifically required a heightened FRCP 9(b) pleading
standard for scienter and misrepresentation, it was silent regarding the
pleading standard required for loss causation. 10 5 In fact, as discussed
previously, the PSLRA was the first codification of loss causation. 10 6 By
passing the PSLRA, Congress bluntly required that "plaintiffs prove that the
loss in the value of their stock was caused by the section 10(b) violation and
not by other factors. ' 10 7 Thus, while the PSLRA finally codified the loss
causation element, it gave little indication as to how a plaintiff may
successfully allege loss causation at the pleadings stage. 10 8
E. The Seminal Case Addressing Securities Fraud Loss Causation: Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo
A thorough understanding of the Supreme Court's only decision
regarding the application of the loss causation element to private securities
fraud suits in light of the PSLRA is required to effectively analyze the
current circuit split. This section first reviews the substantive loss causation
issue confronted by the Court in Dura before examining the decision itself.
Following a review of the facts and holding of Dura, the loss causation
pleading question left unanswered by the Court is introduced.
1. Loss Causation Before Dura and the Pre-Dura Circuit Split
The Dura Court addressed two opposing theories among the circuit
courts regarding how a private securities fraud plaintiff must plead factual
allegations to satisfy loss causation.' 0 9 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits followed what can be called the "date of
purchase" pleading standard. 10 Under this interpretation, plaintiffs may
adequately plead loss causation by alleging that loss occurred at the
moment that the defendant's security was purchased.' I  The theory is that
the purchase price of the stock was artificially inflated above its "intrinsic
value," the value that the stock would truly be worth in the absence of the
104. Id.
105. See id.; Escoffery, supra note 88, at 1810 ("Unfortunately, the statute does not
provide a clear analytical approach to guide courts in determining whether a plaintiff has
sufficiently pled loss causation.").
106. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 7, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 686; see supra note 73
and accompanying text.
107. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 7, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 686.
108. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
109. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 340, 344 (2005); Elizabeth Skey,
Comment, The Private Securities Fraud Claim: What Has Dura's Effect Been on the
Standard for Loss Causation at Summary Judgment?, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 565, 567-68
(2009).
110. See Skey, supra note 109, at 584.
111. See Fry, supra note 69, at 39; Skey, supra note 109, at 569.
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defendant's misrepresentations. 112 Thus, the plaintiff suffers loss by paying
more than this intrinsic value at the time of purchase. 113
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits rejected this view. 114 These courts required loss pleading in
addition to merely alleging an artificially inflated stock price at the time of
purchase. 115 Under this standard, the plaintiff must plead actual economic
loss caused by a market correction, occurring in response to a public
disclosure revealing the defendant's misrepresentation, which in actuality
decreased an inflated stock price to its intrinsic value. 116
2. The Facts and the Holding of Dura
In Dura, the plaintiff shareholders alleged that managers and directors of
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Dura) misrepresented future profits and the
likelihood that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would approve
Dura's new asthmatic inhalation device.11 7 Plaintiffs purchased Dura stock
on the public securities market between April 15, 1997, and February 24,
1998, after the alleged misrepresentations were made. 118 On February 24,
1998, Dura publicly announced that its profits would be lower than
previously claimed. 19 Subsequently, in November 1998, Dura announced
that the inhalation device would not gain FDA approval. 120 Immediately
after the negative announcements, Dura shares fell precipitously, resulting
in plaintiffs' stock losing almost fifty percent of its value. 121 Plaintiffs
claimed that loss occurred at the moment that they purchased Dura shares
because the purchase price was artificially inflated. 122
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed
the complaint for failing to sufficiently state scienter and loss causation. 123
The Ninth Circuit reversed.' 24 With respect to loss causation, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that the shareholders only needed to plead that "'the price
112. See Thomas F. Gillespie III, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo: A Missed
Opportunity To Right the Wrongs in the PSLRA and Rebalance the Private Rule JOb-5
Litigation Playing Field, 3 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 161, 166 (2008).
113. Seeid.
114. See Fry, supra note 69, at 37 (noting that the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second,
Third, and Eleventh Circuits required pleadings in addition to an inflated purchase price);
Scotland M. Duncan, Note, Dura's Effect on Securities Class Actions, 27 J.L. & CoM. 137,
147 (2008) (noting that courts including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
required more than allegations of an inflated purchase price); Skey, supra note 109, at 570.
115. See Fry, supra note 69, at 37; Gillespie, supra note 112, at 166; Duncan, supra note
114, at 147.
116. See, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 112, at 167.
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on the date of purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation.""' 25
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that "'the injury occurs at the time of the
transaction."' 126 In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Breyer, the
Supreme Court reversed, finding error with the Ninth Circuit's analysis of
the loss causation element of the securities fraud claim. 127
The Court discussed three flaws with the Ninth Circuit's holdings. 128
First, the Court explained why the timing element of plaintiffs' claim could
not have caused a loss. 129 The Court found a fundamental flaw with the
Ninth Circuit's view that the loss claimed by the plaintiffs occurred at the
instant that they purchased Dura shares. 130 The Court reasoned that this
interpretation failed a test of "pure logic" because, at the instant an inflated
stock is purchased, no loss has yet occurred, as the shareholders' stock is
still worth exactly as much as he had paid for it.13 1 The Court then stated
that even for a time after the purchase of the stock, the stock's value is not
sure to change. 132 If a shareholder buys a stock at an inflated price, waits,
and then sells the stock, the shareholder will not have suffered a loss if the
stock is still inflated. 133 The Court reasoned that the only way a purchaser
of an inflated stock could suffer economic harm was if he had sold that
stock after "the truth makes its way into the marketplace.' ' 134 Even in this
situation, the defendant's misrepresentation only "might mean a later loss.
But that is far from inevitably so." 135  This is because there are many
factors that affect a stock's value in the marketplace, the revelation of a
misrepresented truth being only one. 136 Other factors that could cause a
stock price to drop include "changed economic circumstances, changed
investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts,
conditions, or other events, which taken separately or together account for
some or all of that lower price."'137 Thus, although an inflated purchase
price may be a "necessary condition" to a later loss, that in and of itself
does not cause the loss.138
Second, the Court found that the Ninth Circuit's holding was
unsupported by precedent. 139 The Court analogized private securities fraud
claims to common-law deceit and misrepresentation claims, stressing that at
125. Id. (quoting Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003)).
126. Id. (quoting Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938).
127. Id. at 336.
128. Id. at 342-46; see Gillespie, supra note 112, at 168-70.
129. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342-43.






136. See id. at 342-43.
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common law "actual economic loss" is a prerequisite to recovery. 140
Because at common law a plaintiff must show "actual damages," the Court
did not find it surprising that a number of other circuit courts rejected the
inflated purchase price theory of loss.141 The Court, in light of other circuit
rulings and the common-law bedrock of private securities actions, was
unwilling to accept the "uniqueness of [the Ninth Circuit's] perspective."' 142
Third, the Court found that the Ninth Circuit's loss causation standard
would not advance the overriding purposes of private securities fraud
claims, nor comport with the statutory language of the PSLRA. 143 The
purpose of private shareholder fraud actions is "to maintain public
confidence in the marketplace," not to "provide investors with broad
insurance against market losses."'144 In addition, the PSLRA "imposes on
plaintiffs 'the burden of proving' that the defendant's misrepresentations
'caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover." ' 145 The Court
read the common-law foundation of Rule 1 Ob-5 actions in conjunction with
the PSLRA to require that a plaintiff prove proximate causation, a demand
not met by simply alleging an inflated purchase price. 146 The Court also
made it clear that the inflated purchase price approach "would permit a
plaintiff 'with a largely groundless claim to simply take up the time of a
number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem
increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded hope
that [discovery] will reveal relevant evidence." '147 Thus, to adequately
plead loss causation after Dura, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, allege that a
security was purchased at an inflated purchase price and that economic loss
was suffered when the price dropped because of a corrective disclosure. 148
3. How the Dura Holding Is Prone to Multiple Interpretations
Having thoroughly rejected the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Court then
began to articulate a pleading standard to test whether a misrepresentation
proximately caused an actual economic loss. 149 The Court's discussion of
how its decision stood in light of conventional pleading standards is of
critical importance to later courts' rulings at the pleadings stage. 150 The
Court twice "concede[d]" that pleading is not intended to be overly
140. Id. at 343-44.
141. Id. at 344.
142. Id. at 345.
143. Id. at 345-46.
144. Id. at 345.
145. Id. at 345-46 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 347 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741
(1975)).
148. See id.
149. Id. at 346.
150. See infra Part II.
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burdensome. 151 However, the Court sidestepped the question of what
specific pleading standard ought to apply to loss causation under the
securities laws and Rule 1Ob-5:
[W]e assume, at least for argument's sake, that neither the Rules nor the
securities statutes impose any special further requirement in respect to the
pleading of proximate causation or economic loss. But, even so, the
"short and plain statement" must provide the defendant with "fair notice
of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."1 52
While the Court framed its conclusion in terms of the short and plain
statement language of FRCP 8(a), the Court declined to explicitly adopt this
standard.153 Instead, the Court showed that the plaintiffs' complaint failed
to meet the FRCP 8(a) pleading standard, even if a heightened FRCP 9(b)
standard was intended by Congress. 154 Thus, while the Dura decision
clearly struck down the inflated purchase price theory in favor of a
proximate cause theory, it was less than clear as to how a plaintiff must
adequately plead loss causation. 155 By discussing securities fraud claims in
terms of both its common-law analog 156 as well as the PSLRA's
language, 157 Dura has led courts to come to differing conclusions as to the
stringency to be applied to loss causation pleadings. 158 The extent of the
loss causation pleading discrepancy is investigated in Part II, where the
divergent standards applied at the circuit court level are identified.
II. POST-DURA CONFUSION: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT RESULTING FROM AN
UNCLEAR STANDARD
This part discusses the divergent post-Dura loss causation pleading
standards applied by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits apply a plausibility standard, requiring
plaintiffs to plead that the alleged misrepresentation plausibly caused their
151. Dura, 544 U.S. at 346 ("We concede that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
require only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief."' (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))). The Court also conceded "that ordinary pleading
rules are not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff." Id. at 347 (citing
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-15 (2002)).
152. Id. at 346 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957)).
153. See id. at 346-47; supra note 151 and accompanying text.
154. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 346 (noting that even if Congress did not impose a heightened
loss causation pleading requirement, plaintiffs' complaint failed the "simple test" of FRCP
8(a)); supra note 152 and accompanying text.
155. See Gillespie, supra note 112, at 170; Duncan, supra note 114, at 147.
156. Dura, 544 U.S. at 344.
157. Id. at 345-46.
158. See SEC Actions, http://www.secactions.com/?p=1350 (July 30, 2009, 11:35 EDT)
[hereinafter SEC Actions I] (discussing differing loss causation pleading standards applied
by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); SEC
Actions, http://www.secactions.coml/?p=456 (Sept, 11, 2008, 5:37 EDT) (discussing
differing loss causation pleading standards applied by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits); infra Part II.
2010] 2677
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
loss. 159 The Fifth Circuit applies this standard under FRCP 8(a). 160 The
Ninth Circuit also appears to consider FRCP 8(a) appropriate, although
without expressly stating so. 1 61 This approach contrasts with that of the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits, both of which apply a more stringent
standard. 162 The Fourth Circuit requires that loss causation be pled with
specificity and explicitly applies this standard under FRCP 9(b). 163 The
Seventh Circuit requires plaintiffs to plead the "very facts" that caused their
loss.164 Although not expressly adopting a stringency standard, the Seventh
Circuit appears to consider FRCP 9(b) appropriate. 165 The Second Circuit
applies a two-part loss causation test, requiring that the loss be foreseeable
and that the misrepresentation be within a zone of risk concealed. 166 This
circuit refrains from specifying a pleading stringency, and instead states that
loss causation is a "fact-based inquiry and the degree of difficulty in
pleading will be affected by [the] circumstances." 167
A. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits: Plausible Loss Causation
The Fifth Circuit's approach to loss causation pleading is analyzed by
considering the 2009 case Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc. 168 Subsequently,
the Ninth Circuit's position is considered in the 2008 case In re Gilead
Sciences Securities Litigation. 169 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits both express
their loss causation pleading standards in terms of plausibility.
1. The Fifth Circuit: Plausibility in Pleading
In Lormand, the Fifth Circuit articulated a plausibility loss causation
pleading test in light of the Supreme Court decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly 170 and Dura.171 The court in Lormand explicitly adopted an
FRCP 8(a) pleading standard. 172
159. See Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 258 (5th Cir. 2009); In re Gilead
Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008).
160. See Lormand, 565 F.3d at 258.
161. See Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1057 ("But so long as the plaintiff alleges facts to support a
theory that is not facially implausible, the court's skepticism is best reserved for later stages
of the proceedings .... ").
162. See SEC Actions I, supra note 158 ("The fourth and seventh circuits however
require that loss causation be pleaded under Rule 9(b).").
163. See, e.g., In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 119-20 (4th Cir. 2009); SEC
Actions I.
164. Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 842 (7th
Cir. 2007).
165. See id. at 843 (rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that Dura does not require
precision in pleading).
166. See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005).
167. Id. at 174.
168. 565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009).
169. 536 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2008).
170. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly is an antitrust case where the
Supreme Court ruled that to plead infringement of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2006), under FRCP 8(a), a plaintiff must allege plausible facts indicating that the
defendant engaged in "parallel conduct." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57. The Twombly
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The plaintiffs in Lormand brought consolidated private class action
claims and derivative shareholder claims alleging that US Unwired, Inc.
violated various laws and corporate duties, including section 10(b) of the
'34 Act and Rule lOb-5.' 73 The plaintiffs alleged that, beginning in
September 2000, US Unwired concealed the riskiness of various subprime
customer programs it was contractually obligated to provide pursuant to a
deal with Sprint Corp.' 74 Despite believing in private that the subprime
strategy would be detrimental to business, US Unwired repeatedly
disseminated a positive business outlook.' 75 The positive representations
allegedly caused US Unwired's stock to artificially inflate to a high of
$4.94.176 US Unwired stock price subsequently plummeted to $0.90 per
share after several public disclosures occurred between June 6, 2002, and
August 13, 2002.177 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for, among other things, failing to
adequately plead loss causation. 178
The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 179 In its treatment
of loss causation, the court initially considered Dura's effect on circuit
precedent. 180 Next, the court discussed the Supreme Court's holding in
Twombly.18 In that case, the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaint, which alleged that the defendants violated antitrust laws. 182 The
Twombly Court held that the plaintiffs complaint lacked enough factual
matter to state a claim of antitrust violations under FRCP 8(a)(2). 183 After
opinion cited Dura when requiring that antitrust allegations be "plausible" rather than
"possible." Id. at 557-58.
171. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 258.
172. See id. at 255.
173. Id. at 237. US Unwired, Inc. was a Louisiana corporation in the business of
providing telecommunications services to customers in parts of fourteen states. Id. at 233.
174. Id. at 234, 237. US Unwired was an affiliate of Sprint Corp. providing Sprint
services to over 500,000 customers. Id. at 233. The allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint
largely arose out of the ramifications relating to a change in US Unwired's affiliation status.
Id. Basically, US Unwired was forced by Sprint to alter the terms of its affiliation to give
significantly more control over US Unwired's business practices to Sprint. Id. Under
contract, US Unwired was obligated to offer services to a subprime population, a service US
Unwired directors privately felt would be, and ultimately was, detrimental to business. Id. at
234-35.
175. Id. Among other negative statements made in private, a US Unwired executive
described one of the subprime programs as being a "colossal mistake." Id. at 235.
176. Id. at 238.
177. Id. at 236.
178. Id. at 238.
179. Id. at 268.
180. Id. at 255-57.
181. Id. at 257-58.
182. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548-49 (2007).
183. Id. Specifically, the Court in Twombly entertained the question of whether a
complaint alleging a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006), could
survive a motion to dismiss if it lacked factual assertions of an actual agreement among the
defendants to engage in anticompetitive behavior. Id. The Court held that the plaintiffs'
complaint made only conclusory statements that did little more than restate the grounds for a
section 1 cause of action. Id. at 556-57. Instead, according to the Court, the plaintiffs were
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discussing the holding of Twombly, the Fifth Circuit interpreted Dura and
Twombly together to establish a loss causation plausibility test. 184 From the
outset of its loss causation inquiry, the court read Dura and Twombly as
having together established FRCP 8(a) as the applicable pleading
standard. 185
In Greenberg v. Crossroads Systems, Inc. 186 the Fifth Circuit established
that to plead loss causation, a plaintiff must allege that a disclosure causing
an economic loss was related to a false misrepresentation and that it was
"more probable than not" that the disclosure, rather than other unrelated
statements, caused the loss.187 The Lormand court read Dura as altering its
Greenberg standard only by requiring a disclosure to be "relevant to,"
rather than "related to," an earlier misrepresentation. 188 Regardless, the
court stated that "neither are steep or difficult standards to satisfy."'189 The
required to plead factual matter in a way that gives rise to a plausible inference that the
defendants had indeed colluded. Id. at 564-66.
184. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257-58.
185. Id. at 255. "Though Twombly is an anti-trust case, it interprets Rule 8(a)(2) and how
it applies generally." Id. at 257 n.24. In Twombly's immediate wake, however, significant
debate arose concerning the extent to which Twombly affected the basic FRCP 8(a) pleading
standard. See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1919,
1932-34 (2009) (noting that Twombly generated significant confusion among scholars and
courts); Catherine T. Struve, Foreword: Procedure as Palimpsest, 422 U. PA. L. REv. 421,
422 (2010) ("Twombly caused urgent debate ...."); Amy J. Wildermuth, What Twombly
and Mead Have in Common, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 276, 276 (2008),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/12/ ("[Twombly] was an
immediate ... source of much academic debate."). The debate continued after the Court
decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Taming
Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 474 (2010) ("Naturally, critics of
Twombly voice the same criticisms of Iqbal but are no longer tempered by the hope that its
range might be limited."); see also Recent Case, 123 HARV. L. REv. 580, 582-84 (2009)
(discussing the plausibility pleading standard under Twombly and Iqbal and its purported
expansion to all civil cases). The plaintiff in Iqbal sued various governmental officials for
instituting a purposely discriminatory policy of targeting and arresting suspects solely
because of their race, religion, or national origin in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942-44. The Court held that the plaintiffs allegations lacked factual
support and, under Twombly, failed to support a plausible inference that the defendants acted
with a discriminatory intent. Id. at 1950-53. After articulating its holding, the Iqbal Court
stated that "Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions."' Id. at 1953
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554). Despite this language, the plausibility standard's
ubiquitous applicability is far from certain. See Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 339-40 (7th
Cir. 2009) (noting that the uniquely complex nature of both Twombly and Iqbal do not
encourage their universal application); United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570
F.3d 849, 854-55 (7th Cir. 2009) (allowing the plaintiffs complaint to survive a motion to
dismiss although it based its claim on inferences); see also Adam Steinman, The Pleading
Problem, 62 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming May 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1442786 (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal did not drastically alter conventional
pleading nor necessarily conflict with decades of Court precedent). Given the already
tortured and uncertain aftermath of Iqbal, this Note will abstain from speculating on Iqbal's
effect on securities pleading.
186. 364 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2004).
187. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 256 n.19 (citing Greenberg, 364 F.3d at 666).
188. See id. at 256.
189. Id. at 256 n.20.
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court then summarized Twombly as requiring a plaintiff to plead facts
sufficient to "raise a reasonable hope or expectation" that the claim will be
substantiated during discovery. 190 This standard does not require a certain
probability of success, only a reasonable expectation that the elements of
the claim will be substantiated.' 91 Finally, after considering its precedent,
Dura, and Twombly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that, to adequately plead
loss causation, FRCP 8(a) "requires the plaintiff to allege . . . a facially
'plausible' causal relationship between the [misrepresentations and the
IOSS]."192
2. The Ninth Circuit: Plausibility in Pleading
The Ninth Circuit explicitly left open the question of whether loss
causation pleading should be evaluated pursuant to an FRCP 8(a) or 9(b)
standard. 193 However, in Gilead, the court did express its view that, as long
as plaintiffs' loss causation theory is not "facially implausible," the suit
should proceed to discovery. 194
In Gilead, shareholder plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Gilead
Sciences, Inc. alleging violations of section 10(b) of the '34 Act and Rule
1Ob-5, among other claims. 195 Gilead was a biopharmaceutical company in
the business of developing and marketing drug treatments for life-
threatening diseases, including HIV. 196 Plaintiffs' allegations centered on
misrepresentations made by Gilead concerning Viread, a new HIV drug. 197
The misrepresentations consisted of assertions that Gilead and its officers
made to the public that the company was in compliance with both federal
and state regulations. 198  Specifically, Gilead asserted that it was in
compliance with the FDA prohibition against marketing a drug for "off-
label" use. 199 Plaintiffs claimed that, despite these assertions, Gilead was
vigorously marketing Viread for off-label use.2 00 Apparently when the
FDA discovered Viread's off-label use, it issued Gilead an "Untitled Letter"
on March 14, 2002, demanding that the illegal actions cease
190. Id. at 257.
191. Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
192. Id. at 258 (citing Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005)).
193. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2008) ("We need not
resolve [the applicable FRCP] issue today.").
194. Id. at 1057.
195. Id. at 1050.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1051.
199. Id. at 1050-5 1. Marketing a drug for off-label use occurs when a drug is sold for the
purpose of treating a condition that was not the subject of Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approval. Id. at 1051.
200. Id. at 1051. Viread had been approved by the FDA for use in about forty percent of
HIV patients. Id. Plaintiffs claimed that Gilead marketed Viread for use in the other sixty
percent of HIV patients, as well as for use by patients with both HIV and Hepatitis B, both of
which violated FDA regulations. Id. According to the plaintiffs, as much as seventy-five to
ninety-five percent of total Viread sales were for off-label uses such as these. Id.
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immediately.201 Gilead allegedly ignored the FDA's demand, and instead,
in June 2003, informed its largest purchasers that the price of Viread would
increase because of high demand, news that caused Gilead share prices to
increase. 202 The FDA then issued a "Warning Letter" on July 29, 2003,
which was soon after made public, ordering Gilead to disclose its marketing
of off-label use of Viread.2 °3 This public disclosure did not initially affect
Gilead's share value in the market.204 Plaintiffs claimed, however, that the
Warning Letter did cause sales to plummet in the third quarter of 2003,
which eventually caused a twelve percent decline in stock price by October
28, 2003.205 Plaintiffs' Rule lOb-5 claim thus asserted that Gilead
continually misrepresented the true nature of Viread's profitability, and
once the FDA's Warning Letter disclosed the illegal truth of Viread's
marketing, Viread sales plummeted, which in turn caused Gilead share
prices to drop several months later after third quarter financials were
released.206
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed
plaintiffs' complaint for failing to adequately plead loss causation under
Dura.20 7 Specifically, the lower court held that the plaintiffs could not
connect the concealed circumstances involving off-label drug use to their
loss, which occurred three months after the disclosure of the FDA Warning
Letter.208
The Ninth Circuit reversed. 209 In framing its discussion, the court began
by emphasizing that a court "ruling on a motion to dismiss is not sitting as a
trier of fact."'210 The Ninth Circuit suggested that the district court was
simply being incredulous, and that its unwillingness to accept plaintiffs'
allegations was premature. 211 The Ninth Circuit went on to state that "so
long as the plaintiff alleges facts to support a theory that is not facially
implausible, the court's skepticism is best reserved for later stages" of the
litigation. 212 Quoting the Supreme Court in Twombly, the Ninth Circuit
explained that even if a judge thinks the chances of proving the facts
alleged are "'improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely,"'
a plaintiffs' loss causation claim can nevertheless defeat a motion to
201. Id. An Untitled Letter is a written communication from the FDA that expresses
disapproval with a firm's promotional activity. Id. at 1052-53.
202. Id at 1051-52. The purchasers then bought massive quantities of Viread with the
legitimate intention of stockpiling the drug before the price hike. Id. Gilead's share price
jumped 13.4%. Id.
203. Id. at 1052-53. A Warning Letter is much more serious than an Untitled Letter and
expresses the FDA's opinion that a particular firm action is illegal. Id.
204. Id. at 1053.




209. Id. at 1056-58.
210. Id. at 1057.
211. Id.; see SEC Actions I, supra note 158.
212. Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1057.
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dismiss. 213 In light of Twombly, the Ninth Circuit decided that as long as
the complaint "alleges facts that, if taken as true, plausibly establish loss
causation, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is inappropriate. This is not 'a
probability requirement . . . it simply calls for enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of loss
causation."214 Applying this test to the case at hand, the Ninth Circuit
found issue with the district court's ruling that three months between the
alleged disclosure and economic loss was per se implausible. 215 Despite the
three month temporal gap, the drop of the "stock price was plausibly caused
by the Warning Letter." 216 The Ninth Circuit also found that a slowing
increase in physicians' demand for Viread after the Warning Letter was
made public was not too speculative. 217
B. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits: Stringent Loss Causation
The Fourth Circuit's approach to loss causation is developed in two post-
Dura decisions. The 2007 case Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana
v. Hunter218 takes a stringent approach to loss causation pleading, requiring
that the fraud-specific FRCP 9(b) pleading standard be met.219 The Fourth
Circuit's heightened pleading stance was further explained in the 2009 case
In re Mutual Funds Investment Litigation.22° The Seventh Circuit's loss
causation approach is expressed in the 2007 cases Tricontinental Industries,
Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP221 and Ray v. Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc.222  The Seventh Circuit also supports a stringent loss
causation pleading standard. 22 3
1. The Fourth Circuit: Pleading with Specificity
Hunter was a class action suit where plaintiff shareholders of Cree, Inc.
filed suit against Cree, Inc. and other related defendants (together
hereinafter referred to as Cree) for violations of the '34 Act and Rule
1Ob-5.224 The complaint alleged that Cree misrepresented the nature of a
number of deals with various other companies from August 12, 1999, to
June 13, 2003, with the purpose of artificially inflating Cree's stock
price.225 Plaintiffs claimed that, to inflate the stock price, Cree became a
213. Id. (quoting Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
214. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
215. Id. at 1057-58.
216. Id. at 1058.
217. Id.
218. 477 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2007).
219. Id. at 185-86; see SEC Actions I, supra note 158.
220. 566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009); see SEC Actions I, supra note 158.
221. 475 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2007).
222. 482 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 2007).
223. See Tricontinental, 475 F.3d at 842.
224. Hunter, 477 F.3d at 167-68.
225. Id. at 168-69.
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party to various "channel-stuffing" schemes226 and "round tripping"
transactions. 227  Plaintiffs alleged that, while the various fraudulent
transactions themselves were known to have existed, the true nature of the
"channel-stuffing" and "round-tripping" schemes were misrepresented by
Cree as having been legitimate. 228 Plaintiffs further alleged that when the
truth regarding the schemes was revealed during a lawsuit involving Cree's
current board chairman and a past CEO, Cree's stock price dropped by
almost twenty percent, causing economic loss to the shareholders. 229
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted
Cree's motion to dismiss because, although the plaintiffs adequately
identified the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations, the plaintiffs failed
to allege facts "'supporting a strong inference of fraud"' with
particularity. 230 With respect to loss causation, the district court held that
plaintiffs failed to "'demonstrate a direct relationship' between the alleged
misrepresentation and economic loss.231
. The Fourth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' appeal from the district court's
dismissal. 232 In framing its loss causation discussion, the court recognized
that loss causation is not one of the elements that the PSLRA specifically
requires be plead with particularity. 233 However, the court cited Dura in
stating, "A strong case can be made that because loss causation is among
the 'circumstances constituting fraud for which Rule 9(b) demands
particularity, loss causation should be pleaded with particularity.' ' 234 The
Fourth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's discussion of FRCP 8(a) in
Dura to imply that even if FRCP 8(a) did apply, the Court would still
require that "loss causation be specifically alleged and demonstrated. '235
The Hunter court, in light of Dura's concern for allowing meritless
securities fraud suits past the dismissal stage,236 as well as Dura's apparent
226. Id. at 169. A "channel-stuffing" scheme is a method to artificially inflate company
revenues by selling huge amounts of a product wholesale and then recording the sales as
revenue. See id. Thus even though the counterparty could return the excess product at any
time, revenue is recorded. See id.
227. Id. A "round-trip" transaction also artificially inflates company revenue. Id. This
scheme is carried out when two parties engage in numerous needless deals to buy and sell
products or services in order to increase booked revenue for both parties. Id.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 168-69.
230. Id. at 169 (quoting In re Cree, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:03CV00549, 2005 WL
1847004, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 2, 2005)).
231. Id. (quoting Cree, 2005 WL 1847004, at * 13).
232. Id. at 168.
233. Id. at 185 ("Loss causation is not one of the elements with respect to which the
PSLRA imposes a more stringent pleading requirement. But the Act does explicitly state
that a plaintiff must prove loss causation ... ").
234. Id. at 186 (citing Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343-44 (2005)). The
court reiterated, "Moreover, the Supreme Court has not ruled out a holding that Rule 9(b)
governs a pleading of loss causation." Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. ("A failure to recognize that loss causation be specifically alleged and
demonstrated by the allegations of the complaint would 'permit a plaintiff with a largely
2684 [Vol. 78
LOSS CA USATION AFTER DURA
requirement for more than simple FRCP 8(a) pleading,237 adopted a
standard requiring that loss causation be plead "with sufficient specificity to
enable the court to evaluate whether the necessary causal link exists. '238
Applying this standard to the plaintiffs' claims against Cree, the court
determined that loss causation was not pled with enough specificity because
the true nature of the fraudulent transactions had either been previously
disclosed, or had been entirely absent from, the internal lawsuit.239
The Fourth Circuit reiterated its specificity standard in Mutual Funds.240
Shareholder plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Janus Capital
Group (JCG) and its fully owned subsidiary Janus Capital Management
(JCM) (collectively, Janus) alleging violations of section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5.24 1 Janus received most of its profits through the dealings of JCM,
which did business as an investment advisor and administrator of Janus
mutual funds. 242  The alleged misrepresentation centered on a clause
contained in Janus prospectuses, which barred the manipulative trading
practice known as "market timing."243  The prospectuses not only
prohibited market timing, but also threatened to temporarily or permanently
shut down a violating investor's ability to purchase shares in the fund.244
Plaintiffs contended that Janus's policy against market timing
"fraudulently induced investors to buy shares in the Janus funds,"
artificially inflating its price.245  Plaintiffs further alleged that Janus's
policy of prohibiting market timing was a deceitful misrepresentation
because a complaint filed by the New York Attorney General later revealed
that Janus made numerous discrete exceptions for specific investors. 246
groundless claim to simply take up the time of a number of other people . (quoting
Dura, 544 U.S. at 347-48)).
237. Id. ("The Court required something more .....
238. Id.
239. Id. at 186-67.
240. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 119-20 (4th Cir. 2009).
241. Id. at 114.
242. Id. at 115.
243. Id. at 116. Market timing is a technique whereby sophisticated traders utilize an
inherent timing delay in the valuation of funds invested in foreign securities to purchase a
fund at a low price and then sell the fund at a higher price after its true value has been
ascertained. See id. The timing delay occurs because some funds (like those managed by
Janus) are valued once daily, typically near the closing of major U.S. markets. Id. The
current true value of the foreign security investments on any given day could be observed at
the closing of their respective markets. Id. Because U.S. markets close later in the day than
most foreign markets, a window of time exists each day where an investor can identify the
value of the foreign securities held by Janus funds and then, based on their performance,
predict whether the Janus funds' values will increase or decrease by the time of their
valuations. See id. The practice of market timing produces great profits for its utilizers, but
harms other investors by "diluting the value of shares, increasing transaction costs, reducing
investment opportunities for the fund, and producing negative tax consequences." Id.
244. Id. at 116-17. Janus prospectuses read, "Our stated policy is that we do not tolerate
[market] timers." Id. at 118.
245. Id. at 118.
246. See id. at 117. Internal memos allegedly showed that employees of Janus knew that
what they were doing was in violation of the terms specified in the prospectus. See id.
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This September 2003 disclosure allegedly resulted in a massive market
correction in Janus share value, which dropped by $14 billion over the
following months.247
The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the
complaint for failing to sufficiently plead loss causation, among other
things. 248 In an opinion reversing the district court's dismissal, the Fourth
Circuit grounded its loss causation discussion in terms of proximate
causation. 249  The court stated that to proximately cause a loss, a
misrepresentation need not be the only cause, but must be a substantial
cause of the loss. 250 After stressing that a multitude of factors can play a
role in plaintiffs' loss, the court applied the standard set forth in Hunter by
requiring that the plaintiff plead with "sufficient specificity" how the
misrepresentation was a substantial cause of their loss. 25 1  While
recognizing that Congress did not articulate a special pleading standard for
loss causation in the PSLRA, the court applied its specificity test in light of
FRCP 9(b): 252
[T]he PSLRA's heightened pleading requirements do not govern our
analysis of the elements of... loss causation.
Rather, we must look to traditional pleading requirements for fraud
claims. At the time of the filing of the complaint in this action, Rule 9(b)
provided that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. '253
The court found that the plaintiffs had pled loss causation with sufficient
specificity by stating in detail that their investments in JCM were intimately
connected with the performance of JCG,2 54 that they suffered two specific
types of losses,255 and that the rate of share withdrawal after the disclosure
increased three and a half times compared to the previous eight months.256
247. Id. at 118.
248. Id. at 115.
249. Id. at 128.
250. See id.
251. Id. at 128-29.
252. See SEC Actions I, supra note 158.
253. Mutual Funds, 566 F.3d at 119-20 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b)).
254. Id. at 128. Plaintiffs showed that the assets under management by Janus Capital
Management (JCM) generated more than ninety percent of Janus Capital Group's (JCG)
revenue and that any significant change in JCM assets would inevitably impact JCG
stockholders. Id. at 128-29. Plaintiffs further supported their showing of JCG's profitability
by pointing to JCG's SEC Form 10-K. Id. at 129.
255. Id. at 128. Plaintiffs alleged two specific economic losses: one occurring when JCG
was ordered to pay over $325 million in fines, penalties, and settlements to regulatory
authorities, and another occurring when JCG stock plummeted by millions of dollars. Id.
256. Id. at 128-29.
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2. The Seventh Circuit: Pleading the "Very Facts"
The Seventh Circuit, although not specifically adopting FRCP 9(b),
seems to support a heightened standard of loss causation pleading.257 The
court in both Tricontinental and Ray dismissed shareholder plaintiff
complaints because they failed to plead with precision that the risk causing
economic loss was the exact risk that was concealed by the defendant's
misrepresentation. 258
In Tricontinental, Tricontinental Industries filed suit against
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) for securities fraud, among other things.259
Tricontinental alleged that PwC, as an auditor, misrepresented the financial
worth of its client Anicom, Inc. to Tricontinental in connection with
transactions whereby Tricontinental acquired Anicom stock in September
1998.260
Anicom allegedly engaged in improper accounting practices to enable it
to report higher revenue than actually existed.261 Tricontinental claimed
that PwC knew of these improper practices in July 1997 but failed to
disclose this information by certifying Anicom's 1998 and 1999 financial
statements. 262 In fact, according to Tricontinental, PwC asserted that these
fraudulent financial statements were "accurate, complete and in conformity
with" Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 263 However, in
July 2000, Anicom announced that it had conducted an internal
investigation and that it had overstated revenue by approximately $39.6
million from the first quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2000.264 In
January 2001, Anicom filed for bankruptcy and its stock price fell. 265
Tricontinental claimed that it suffered economic loss when the price of its
257. See Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 843
(7th Cir. 2007) (rejecting plaintiffs' contention that Dura does not require precision in
pleading).
258. See Ray v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 482 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 2007);
Tricontinental, 475 F.3d at 842.
259. Tricontinental, 475 F.3d at 827.
260. Id. at 827-28. Anicom, Inc. was a wire distribution company that had made it
common practice to acquire other corporations in exchange for Anicom stock. Id. The
transactions at issue involved an exchange of certain Tricontinental Industries assets for
Anicom stock. Id. at 827.
261. Id. at 828. Tricontinental claimed that Anicom created fictitious sales orders, known
as "prebills," for goods that were never purchased, thus artificially inflating its sales
recordations. Id.
262. Id. According to Tricontinental's complaint, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) had
uncovered the prebills during an investigation into Anicom's billing practices and had




265. Id. After Anicom's bankruptcy declaration, the SEC and FBI conducted
investigations and found Anicom executives guilty of various crimes, including fraud. Id. at
828-29. The SEC's complaints alleged that the Anicom executives lied to PwC about the
truth of their financial statements for 1998, 1999, and 2000. Id. at 829.
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Anicom shares, all of which were acquired in the September 1998 purchase,
fell after Anicom's announced bankruptcy. 266
The securities fraud portion of Tricontinental's complaint alleged that
PwC made deceptive and false representations in connection with Anicom's
1997 audit statements in violation of section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5. 267 The
1997 statements were the basis for Tricontinental's business engagements
with Anicom. 268 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois held that Tricontinental's claim failed to adequately allege loss
causation because Anicom's stock dropped following the corrective
disclosure of misstatements in Anicom's post-1997 financial statements and
its subsequent bankruptcy filing, but not because of public disclosure of
inflated financial statements from 1997 as claimed by Tricontinental, 269
The Seventh Circuit affirmed.270 The court rejected Tricontinental's
contention that Dura does not require "precision in pleading" with respect
to loss causation. 271 Instead, the court faulted Tricontinental for failing to
set forth "any facts showing that the losses it suffered are proximately
linked to the alleged misstatements in the 1997 financial statement. '272 The
court relied on its prior decision in Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare
Corp.273 to require that a "'plaintiff must allege that it was the very facts
about which the defendant lied which caused its injuries."'' 274
Tricontinental, the court decided, had failed to show how the 2000
disclosures alluding to "accounting irregularities" directly referred to the
1997 false financial statements that Tricontinental claimed caused its
loss. 275 In doing so, the court rejected the possibility that the 1997 financial
statement, although not the subject of the 2000 disclosures, was
nevertheless part of a single ongoing fraud that could have caused
plaintiffs' loss. 276
In addition to requiring the precise pleading of facts, the Seventh Circuit
seemed to adopt a heightened pleading standard by framing the standard of
review predominately in terms of FRCP 9(b), stressing how the PSLRA
places additional requirements on pleadings as they already exist under
FRCP 9(b).277 When discussing common-law fraud, the court defined the
"'circumstances constituting fraud,"' which must be stated with
particularity under FRCP 9(b), as including the "'who, what, when, where,
266. Id. at 828.
267. Id. at 831,842.
268. Id. at 842.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 845.
271. Id. at 843.
272. Id. at 844.
273. 113 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1997).
274. Tricontinental, 475 F.3d at 842 (quoting Caremark, 113 F.3d at 648).
275. Id. at 843.
276. See id. at 844.
277. Id. at 833 n.7.
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and how. "' 278 Thus, although without explicitly saying so in the context of
securities fraud, Tricontinental suggests that loss causation (the "how") is to
be evaluated with particularity in the Seventh Circuit.279
Three months after its decision in Tricontinental, the Seventh Circuit
again considered loss causation in Ray. In Ray, investor plaintiffs brought
suit against investment advisor John Spatz, his employer, Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc., and its parent company, Citigroup, Inc. (collectively,
Citigroup) for section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 violations.280 According to the
plaintiffs' complaint, Citigroup fraudulently induced plaintiffs to purchase
exorbitant amounts of stock in Smartserv Online, Inc. (SSOL), from 2000
to 2002.281 Plaintiffs claimed that during this time, although the stock
market as a whole had been volatile, Citigroup encouraged the purchase of
SSOL stock because "SSOL was still a great deal" and SSOL had signed
substantial contracts with large mainstream corporations promising huge
future payoffs.282  However, Citigroup failed to reveal, according to
plaintiffs, that SSOL was having problems fulfilling its contracts with a
number of other large corporations. 283 Plaintiffs claimed that by failing to
disclose SSOL's contractual problems and only citing its high profile
signings, Citigroup caused plaintiffs to perceive SSOL as a safe investment,
which induced plaintiffs' purchase of millions of dollars of SSOL stock.284
Plaintiffs further contended that when the truth of SSOL's financial position
was revealed, SSOL's share price plummeted from a high of $80 to $1 per
share. 285
The Northern District of Illinois dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for
failing to adequately plead loss causation.286 The lower court found that
plaintiffs could not show that the alleged misrepresentations caused SSOL's
stock price to plummet. 287 On appeal, plaintiffs argued that "Citigroup's
misrepresentations were the reason" that the stock price fell and that "SSOL
never had the contracts, revenues, or funding" that Citigroup represented. 288
The Seventh Circuit rejected plaintiffs' contentions and affirmed the
district court.289 The circuit court reiterated its requirement set forth in
Caremark and applied in Tricontinental that a plaintiff must plead that "'it
was the very facts about which the defendant lied which caused its
278. Id. at 833, 844 (quoting DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir.
1990)).
279. See SEC Actions I, supra note 158.
280. Ray v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 482 F.3d 991, 992 (7th Cir. 2007).
281. Id. at 992-93. Smartserv Online, Inc. (SSOL) was a business in the wireless data
services industry. Id. at 993.




286. Id. at 994.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 992.
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injuries."' 290 The court found that plaintiffs had merely alleged transaction
causation: that but for the misrepresentations, they would not have
purchased SSOL stock.291 However, plaintiffs in no way showed that the
concealed financial state of SSOL caused its stock to drop upon a
disclosure. 292  Rather, as defendants asserted, the court concluded that
SSOL lost its value because of market forces. 293 The Seventh Circuit, by
requiring that plaintiffs plead the very facts that caused the loss, places the
burden on the plaintiffs at the pleadings stage to specifically show which
factors, out of a number of contributing factors, caused the loss. 2 94
C. The Second Circuit: Two-Part Loss Causation
This section analyzes three cases, all decided since 2005, in which the
Second Circuit discussed loss causation. The first case, Lentell v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., 295 was decided three months prior to Dura. Lentell
established that to proximately cause plaintiffs' loss, the risk allegedly
causing the loss must (1) have foreseeably caused plaintiffs' loss and (2)
have been within a "zone of risk concealed" by the defendant's
misrepresentation. 296 The Second Circuit again considered loss causation
in the January 2007 case Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP.297 The
Lattanzio court did not cite Dura, but applied the Lentell standard in finding
that plaintiffs failed to plead loss causation. 298 Six months after Lattanzio,
the Second Circuit decided ATSI Communications, Inc. v. The Shaar Fund,
Ltd.299 In ATSI, the court relied on both Dura and Lentell as it verified its
previously developed proximate cause loss causation standard.300
In Lentell, class action plaintiffs were investors who allegedly relied on
Merrill Lynch & Co. and key analyst Henry M. Blodget (collectively,
Merrill Lynch) when deciding to invest heavily in the technology
companies 24/7 Real Media, Inc. and Interliant, Inc. 30 1 Plaintiffs' core
allegations stated that Merrill Lynch fraudulently recommended that
plaintiffs purchase the technology companies' stock over a nearly two-year
period stretching from May 12, 1999, through February 20, 2001 (the class
period).302 Plaintiffs claimed that Merrill Lynch rated the companies' stock




293. Id. at 995-96. SSOL's main competitors also saw their stock value deteriorate over
the same time period. Id. at 993-94.
294. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
295. 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005).
296. Id. at 173 (emphasis omitted).
297. 476 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2007).
298. See infra notes 319-25 and accompanying text.
299. 493 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2007).
300. See infra notes 334-38 and accompanying text.
301. Lentell, 396 F.3d at 164.
302. Id. at 165.
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at "buy" or "accumulate" 30 3 over the class period, not because they were in
fact good buys, but instead to further their banking-client relationship with
the companies and increase the companies' stock prices. 304
Plaintiffs alleged that Merrill Lynch's analysts did not actually believe
the securities were good investments. 30 5  Because of defendants'
misstatements and omissions, plaintiffs bought the companies' stock. 306
Finally, when the stock values deteriorated, plaintiffs lost millions of
dollars. 307 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for, among other things, failing to
sufficiently plead loss causation. 30 8
In affirming the dismissal, the Second Circuit articulated its two-part test
for loss causation in terms of proximate causation. 30 9 Proximate causation
in securities fraud suits, the court noted, is different than in tort suits
because the defendant's misrepresentations do not actually cause a drop in
stock value.310  It is the underlying truth concealed by the
misrepresentations that causes the stock value correction.311  The court
reasoned that in light of this fundamental difference, a plaintiff must allege
that the subject matter of the misrepresentation caused the loss.312  In
addition to pleading the relevant subject matter, the court required that the
loss be foreseeable. 313 Applying this standard to plaintiffs' claims, the
court found that the alleged misrepresentations did not in fact conceal the
underlying risk of the companies' true values: risk assessing information
was always available to the public and was not within the "zone of risk
concealed" by the alleged misrepresentation. 314 Thus, loss causation as
303. Merrill Lynch analysts ranked a security's appreciation potential on a scale
consisting of six terms: "1-Buy; 2-Accumulate; 3-Neutral; 4-Reduce; 5-Sell; 6-No
Rating." Id. at 166.
304. Id. at 166-67. This conflict of interest on the part of Merrill Lynch is not supposed
to occur because the analyst and trading departments of investment banks are theoretically
separated by what is called a "Chinese Wall." Id. at 165. The court recognized that the
Chinese Wall concept was susceptible to a conflict of interest, but declined to allow the
presence of a conflict of interest alone to support a complaint alleging fraud. Id. at 170.
305. Id. at 172.
306. Id.
307. Id. The stock value of 24/7 Real Media, Inc. fell from $45.125 at the beginning of
the class period to $2.9375 at the close of the class period, after reaching a high of $64.625.
Id. at 166. Interliant, Inc. stock fell from $16.375 at the beginning of the class period to
$4.00 at the end of the class period, after reaching a high of $55.50. Id. at 167.
308. Id. at 164.
309. See id. at 173-78.
310. Id. at 173. See generally supra Part I.D.1.
311. Lentell, 396 F.3d at 173.
312. Id. (citing Suez Equity Investors, LP v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 95
(2d Cir. 2001)).
313. Id. This two-part loss causation test was not entirely new; the court cited a number
of Second Circuit decisions applying similar articulations of loss causation. Id. at 174 (citing
Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003);
Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Suez Equity, 250 F.3d at
87).
314. Id. at 173, 177 (emphasis omitted).
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applied by the Second Circuit in Lentell "require[s] both that the loss be
foreseeable and that the loss be caused by the materialization of the
concealed risk. '315
The Second Circuit reiterated its proximate cause approach in Lattanzio,
where class action plaintiffs were shareholders of Warnaco Group, Inc. who
brought suit against Warnaco's outside accountant, Deloitte & Touche
LLP.316 Plaintiffs alleged that Deloitte misrepresented Warnaco's financial
state and failed to correct previous false financial misstatements, thus
concealing the risk of Warnaco's financial collapse, and subsequently
causing loss when Warnaco filed for bankruptcy. 317 The Southern District
of New York dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for, among other things,
failing to adequately allege loss causation. 318
In affirming the district court's dismissal, the Second Circuit applied
Lentell's proximate cause loss causation standard.319 The court rejected
plaintiffs' allegation that Deloitte's misrepresentation-that its audits
comported with GAAP-was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' economic
loss. 320 The court held that the claimed misrepresented risk was outside the
"zone of risk" acceptable under Lentell.321 The court noted that if simply
showing that failure to meet GAAP standards was sufficient to show
causation, the misrepresentation element would subsume loss causation.322
Instead, plaintiffs were required to allege that the possibility of bankruptcy
was concealed, as it was the bankruptcy that caused their economic loss. 323
However, the plaintiffs were unable to allege that Warnaco's bankruptcy
caused their loss because the possibility of bankruptcy was not "altogether
concealed. '324 Thus, the Lattanzio court applied the test articulated in
Lentell, requiring that the underlying risk concealed by defendant's
misrepresentation proximately cause plaintiff s harm. 325
The Second Circuit applied Lentell again in ATSI. ATSI
Communications, Inc. was a telecommunications service provider start-up
doing business in Latin America. 326 ATSI sued The Shaar Fund and
several related entities (hereinafter referred to as Shaar) for alleged
misrepresentation and market manipulation in connection with the purchase
of ATSI stock in violation of the '34 Act and Rule lOb-5. 32 7 Specifically,
ATSI claimed that the defendant misrepresented its intention of investing in
315. Id. at 173.
316. Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 476 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 2007).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 150-51.






325. Id. at 157-58.
326. ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. The Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2007).
327. Id. at 93.
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ATSI's long-term growth by taking advantage of ATSI's stock structure. 328
After purchasing ATSI convertible stock, the defendants allegedly short
sold massive amounts of ATSI common stock and then covered by
converting their convertible preferred stock into common stock.329 The
perpetration of this scheme allegedly created a "death spiral" and caused
ATSI's stock value to plummet. 330  ATSI claimed that Shaar
misrepresented that it would not engage in short selling of ATSI stock and
that Shaar was an accredited investor as understood by Rule 501 of
Regulation D under the '33 Act. 331 ATSI claimed that had it known the
truth about Shaar's intentions and accreditation, it never would have sold
Shaar its convertible preferred stock and suffered economic loss.332
The Southern District of New York dismissed three iterations of ATSI's
complaint for failing to satisfy the pleading requirements for a securities
fraud claim under FRCP 9(b) and the PSLRA. 333 The Second Circuit, after
applying the heightened fraud pleading standards of FRCP 9(b) and the
PSLRA to most of ATSI's misrepresentation and market manipulation
claims, ruled on loss causation for the claim alleging that Shaar fraudulently
misrepresented its accreditation status.334
The Second Circuit cited both Dura and Lentell for the proposition that
adequate loss causation allegations require the plaintiff to show that a
proximate causal link exists connecting the defendant's misrepresentation
to the alleged economic loss. 335 The court then conducted the remainder of
its inquiry under Lentell, stating that the plaintiff "must plead that the loss
was foreseeable and caused by the materialization of the risk concealed by
the fraudulent statement." 336 The plaintiffs attempted to fit their allegations
328. Id. at 95-96. At the time of the alleged fraud, ATSI Communications, Inc. (ATSI)
was in desperate need for a capital infusion. Id. at 93. In order to raise capital, ATSI created
an investor friendly stock structure whereby classes of convertible preferred stock were
issued. See id. at 94. The preferred stock could be converted to common stock at favorable
rates to investors after a certain date. Id. at 96.
329. Id. at 96. A short sell is an investing technique whereby the investor borrows a
security, then sells the security with the expectation that the value of the security will fall,
and then repurchases the security at a lower price in order to simultaneously repay the initial
loan and come away with a profit. Id. at 96 n. 1.
330. Id. at 96. This type of scheme allows the short seller to make extraordinary profits
because the converted preferred to common stock used to cover the initial short sell was
obtained at below market rates. See id. The short seller further benefits from the scheme
because it is essentially risk-free: if the price of the stock unexpectedly shoots up, the
convertible stocks are always available to cover without responding to market effects. See id.
Finally, the scheme is detrimental to the stock issuer because each conversion and sale of
preferred stock dilutes the issuer's outstanding common stock, resulting in a decrease in its
value. See id.
331. Id. at95.
332. Id. at 106-07.
333. Id. at 98.
334. Id. at 99-106.
335. Id. at 106-07 (citing Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005);
Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005)).
336. Id. at 107 (citing Lentell, 396 F.3d at 173).
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into the mold set forth by Lentell.337 They claimed that the risk concealed
by defendant's accreditation misrepresentation was their trustworthiness,
which, when revealed to be poor, caused plaintiffs' economic loss.338
However the court rejected this contention as merely a restatement of
transaction causation, which explains why a transaction was made, but not
why loss was caused. 339  Put another way, the court found that the
concealed information of Shaar's accreditation status, when revealed, did
not cause ATSI's stock price to drop.
III. EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT CIRCUIT DOCTRINES AND WHY THE
SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S TwO-PART LOSS
CAUSATION PLEADING STANDARD
Judicial application of pleading standards is a matter of critical
importance in our legal system. At this stage, one seeking justice faces the
courthouse gatekeeper. The features of the court gatekeeper with respect to
the loss causation element of a section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 private
securities fraud claim have received sparse treatment from Congress. 340
The Supreme Court has likewise done little to define a pleading standard.341
Thus, the various circuits have been left to reconcile their contrasting loss
causation pleading precedents with incomplete guidance from national
lawmakers and the nation's highest court. 342
In the absence of further input from Congress, the Supreme Court should
adopt the Second Circuit's approach to loss causation pleading. The
Second Circuit's two-part foreseeability and "zone of the risk concealed"
approach is most closely in line with congressional intent, the language of
Dura, and loss causation's historical underpinnings as a tort-developed
element. Conversely, the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit
approaches should be rejected. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits' easily met
plausibility standard fails to live up to the objectives of the PSLRA.
Similarly, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits' heightened standards are
supported by neither Dura nor the PSLRA.
A. Analysis of the Second Circuit's Interpretation of Loss Causation and
Why This Approach Should Be Adopted by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court should adopt the Second Circuit's loss causation
pleading standard. As articulated in Part II.C, the Second Circuit evaluates
loss causation at the pleadings stage pursuant to a two-part inquiry: (1) the
loss must be foreseeable, and (2) the risk that caused the loss must have
been within the zone of risk concealed by the misrepresentation. 343 This
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.; see supra Part I.D.1.
340. See supra Part I.D.; supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
341. See supra Part I.E.
342. See supra Part II.
343. See supra notes 309-13 and accompanying text.
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test should be adopted rather than the plausibility standard applied by the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits and the specificity standards applied by the Fourth
and Seventh Circuits for three reasons.
First, and most importantly, the Second Circuit test is most in line with
Dura and the purpose of the PSLRA. Similar to the Supreme Court, the
Second Circuit has refrained from adopting a heightened FRCP 9(b)
pleading standard for loss causation. 344 However, as intended by the
PSLRA, and unlike the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' application of FRCP 8(a),
the Second Circuit test does require the court to take loss causation
allegations seriously at the pleadings stage.345
The Second Circuit's "zone of the risk concealed" inquiry is instrumental
in satisfying the PSLRA by preventing strike suits from progressing past the
pleadings stage. This inquiry determines whether the cause of loss, after
such cause had been disclosed, was within the actual zone of subject matter
misrepresented. 346  Thus, if the subject matter of the alleged
misrepresentation and the loss caused by a disclosure measurably differ, the
allegations would fail the "zone of the risk concealed" test.347 This is
critical. For instance, a defendant pharmaceutical firm represents that a
new high profile drug will receive FDA approval, but later it is revealed
that the drug will not receive FDA approval, and this disclosure is followed
by a drop in existing drug sales. Under the Second Circuit's standard, a
plaintiff would not be able to claim that the representations of FDA
approval caused loss when existing sales declined. The risk causing loss
(existing drug sales) is not within the zone of risk concealed (likelihood of
new drug approval). However, a plaintiff in the Fifth or Ninth Circuits
would likely be able to construct a claim linking the new drug's failure to
gain FDA approval to the later drop in existing drug sales in a way that is
not facially implausible (perhaps by alleging that the denial of FDA
approval of the new drug harmed defendant's reputation, which caused
existing sales to drop). The difference between the Second Circuit
approach and Fifth and Ninth Circuit approaches in this example is crucial
because it is exactly this type of factual scenario that the PSLRA sought to
address: where young, growing, high-tech companies experience stock
volatilities because of the bang or bust nature of key products.348 Thus, by
requiring the subject matter of the risk causing loss to factually match the
corresponding misrepresentations, the Second Circuit test stays true to the
primary intent of the PSLRA and protects the most vulnerable enterprises
from opportunistic strike suits.
Second, Congress intended that the PSLRA codify the securities fraud
pleading standards of the Second Circuit.349 While stopping short of
344. See supra Part II.C.
345. See supra Part II.C.
346. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
348. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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codifying Second Circuit case law, Congress suggested that courts might
find this law instructive in applying the pleading requirements under the
PSLRA. 350 The two-part Second Circuit loss causation test is grounded in
that circuit's precedent, thus giving weight to the argument that Congress
would look favorably upon its universal adoption.351
Third, the test's foreseeability requirement invokes loss causation's roots
in tort to ensure that if a risk is otherwise concealed and causes harm, a
defendant will only be held liable for losses foreseeably caused by its
actions. 352 Such a foreseeability requirement is noticeably absent from the
other circuits' pleading standards. 353 While foreseeability is inherently an
aspect of whether a loss causation theory is tenable, the Second Circuit is
unique in conspicuously subjecting any claim to a foreseeability test at the
pleadings stage. 354 In doing so, the Second Circuit uses loss causation's
tort origin as a tool to reject unmeritorious claims at the pleadings stage,
although they may otherwise pass muster under a materialization of the risk
test.
B. Why the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits' Loss Causation
Pleading Standards Should Be Rejected
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits' plausibility approach does not do justice to
the primary goal of the PSLRA: to prevent strike suits. In addition, this
standard is largely derived from Twombly, a decision of uncertain relevance
outside of antitrust law. The stringent standards developed by the Fourth
and Seventh Circuits are equally inadequate, as neither the PSLRA nor
Dura establish a heightened pleading standard for loss causation.
1. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits
In Lormand, the Fifth Circuit expressly held that FRCP 8(a) governs loss
causation pleading.355 In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit declared that a
facially plausible causal relationship between the misrepresentation and the
loss is sufficient to adequately plead loss causation. 356 In reconciling its
precedent with Twombly and Dura, the court clarified that the causal
relationship requires that a disclosure merely be "'relevant to"' an earlier
misrepresentation. 357 This standard is admittedly easily met. 358
350. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 313.
352. See supra Part II.C.
353. See supra Part II.A-B.
354. See supra Part II.A-B.
355. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
357. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 256 (5th Cir. 2009); see supra note 188
and accompanying text.
358. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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In Gilead, the Ninth Circuit adopted a similarly facile loss causation
pleading standard.359 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that it is not a trier of
fact when considering a motion to dismiss. 360 Relying on Twombly and
Dura, the Ninth Circuit decided that even if the plaintiffs' theory of loss
causation was unlikely to lead to recovery, a complaint should not be
dismissed for this reason alone. 361  Thus, to warrant dismissal at the
pleadings stage, the Ninth Circuit must find the plaintiffs' loss causation
argument "facially implausible. '" 362
Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits misplace reliance on Twombly when
articulating their plausibility pleading standards. 363 In the Fifth Circuit's
pleading standard analysis in Lormand, the court initially discussed the
PSLRA and the impact of Dura.364 However, the court then grounded
much of the remainder of its discussion, and in fact framed its loss
causation pleading standard in terms of, the Supreme Court's Twombly
decision.365 The Ninth Circuit in Gilead also adopted the Supreme Court's
language in Twombly while setting forth its loss causation standard. 366
However, neither Dura nor the PSLRA expressly indicated that FRCP
8(a) generally applies to loss causation. 367 In fact, it seems clear from Dura
that, in the context of securities fraud, a more stringent standard than FRCP
8(a) pleading is required. 368 Thus, even assuming Twombly applies to
pleading under FRCP 8(a) generally, which is not clearly established, it
would nevertheless be inconsistent with the aims of the PSLRA in Rule
1Ob-5 securities fraud cases to plead under the Twombly standard.
Moreover, it seems that basing a loss causation pleading standard on
Twombly, given Twombly's unclear impact on FRCP 8(a), simply increases
uncertainty in the loss causation pleading context. 369
More importantly, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' pleading standards fall
short of Congress's goals in passing the PSLRA.370 The Ninth Circuit in
Gilead stated that a complaint may proceed even if "'actual proof of those
facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely."' 371
This is in contravention of the purpose of the PSLRA.372 In fact, the core
impetus for passing the PSLRA was to curtail "strike suits" that were
359. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
362. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008); see supra note
212 and accompanying text.
363. See supra Part II.A.
364. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
367. See supra Part I.D-E.
368. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 185.
370. See supra Part I.D.2.
371. In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Ati.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)); see supra note 213 and accompanying text.
372. See supra Part I.D.2.
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initiated with no hope of ultimate recovery, but simply for their settlement
value. 373  The PSLRA sought to decrease such abusive suits at the
pleadings stage, not after an expensive discovery process had already been
permitted.374 As applied by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, a plaintiff
presenting any plausible cause of action delays discussion of merits until
after discovery. 375 Because this pleading standard is derived largely from
an uncertain antitrust case, without giving adequate consideration to the
concerns addressed by the PSLRA, it should be rejected.376
2. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits
The stringent standards applied by the Fourth and Seventh Circuits
should be rejected because they do not find support in Dura or the PSLRA.
In Hunter, the Fourth Circuit adopted a loss causation pleading standard
requiring that plaintiffs plead with "sufficient specificity" the relation
between a disclosure and a previous misrepresentation. 377 In doing so, the
court stressed that a "strong case can be made" that loss causation should be
plead with FRCP 9(b) particularity. 378  The Fourth Circuit expanded on
Hunter in Mutual Funds and expressly applied its specificity test under
FRCP 9(b).37 9  Specifically, the court required a misrepresentation to
proximately cause plaintiffs' loss, which must be shown by pleading with
"specificity" how the misrepresentation was a substantial cause of the
loss. 380
The Seventh Circuit, similarly to the Fourth Circuit, requires that
plaintiffs specifically plead how alleged misrepresentations caused loss. 38 1
In Tricontinental, the Seventh Circuit required plaintiffs to plead that the
"'very facts"' misrepresented caused loss.382 The court rejected plaintiffs'
contention that Dura did not require "precision in pleading. '383 Although
not expressly requiring pleading with FRCP 9(b) particularity, the Seventh
Circuit does require plaintiffs to specifically isolate the precise facts that
upon disclosure caused the loss notwithstanding other contributing
factors. 384
373. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
375. See supra Part II.A.
376. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
377. Teachers' Ret. Sys. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 186 (4th Cir. 2007); see supra note 238
and accompanying text.
378. Hunter, 477 F.3d at 186; see supra note 234.
379. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
380. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 128 (4th Cir. 2009); see supra note 251
and accompanying text.
381. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
382. Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 842 (7th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare Corp., 113 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir.
1997)); see supra note 274 and accompanying text.
383. Tricontinental, 475 F.3d at 843; see supra note 271.
384. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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As articulated in Part I, the PSLRA was enacted to decrease the number
of abusive lawsuits surviving the pleadings stage.385 The PSLRA sought to
accomplish this goal by raising pleading standards.386 Congress was clear
in requiring that the elements of misrepresentation and scienter be plead
with particularity. 387 With regards to loss causation, however, Congress
simply stated that a plaintiff must "prove" loss causation. 388 By requiring
pleading with specificity, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits place loss
causation on equal footing with misrepresentation and scienter pleading
under the PSLRA.389  Because Congress had a clear opportunity to
articulate an identical standard for each fraud element and decided to
abstain from doing so, it seems clear that these circuits have unjustifiably
extended particularity in pleading to loss causation.
The more stringent standards applied by the Fourth and Seventh Circuits
are not supported by Dura. Although Dura's major shortcoming was its
failure to articulate a pleading standard for loss causation, the Court did not
come close to adopting FRCP 9(b). Instead, the Court framed its discussion
in terms of FRCP 8(a), and, although recognizing that a plaintiff must prove
loss causation, the Court nevertheless conceded that the applicable Federal
Rules only require a short and plain statement. 390 Thus, without further
input from Congress, an appropriate loss causation standard must be framed
as some iteration of FRCP 8(a)'s short and plain statement requirement. It
follows that the question after Dura is not whether a plaintiff must submit a
short and plain statement, but rather what the short and plain statement must
allege.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate pleading standard to apply to the loss causation element
of private securities fraud claims is a question left unanswered by Congress
and the Supreme Court. The Court's direct confrontation with loss
causation in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo established that to plead
loss causation, a plaintiff must allege that an economic loss occurred after a
corrective disclosure revealed the truth underlying a previous
misrepresentation. However, Dura's unanimous decision did little to
delineate a test for assessing loss causation at the pleadings stage. To the
contrary, the Dura Court articulated its holding through a number of
assumptions and concessions, largely evading the pleadings question
altogether.
Unsurprisingly, the circuit courts have interpreted Dura in a number of
ways. In recent years, the courts have fashioned divergent loss causation
pleading standards based on their individual readings of Dura, some
385. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
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applying liberal FRCP 8(a) standards, while others have advanced more
stringent standards under FRCP 9(b).
The Supreme Court should not wait on Congress to revisit loss causation
pleading, as the securities fraud elements have historically been judicially
developed, and it has been fifteen years since lawmakers' first and only
terse treatment of the matter. The Court should instead proactively
reconcile the circuit split and adopt the pleading standard currently in force
in the Second Circuit. The Court should adopt the Second Circuit approach
because its two-part inquiry ensures that only claims alleging a close
connection between loss and misrepresentation survive pleadings, yet
refrains from adopting a heightened standard unsupported by the PSLRA or
Dura.
